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It is a commonplace observation that historically established modes of
state formation are inadequately adapted to global social scale (see for
example Kettl 2000; and for a theoretically sophisticated treatment of
this issue Sassen 2000), although as we shall see this observation un-
derestimates the dynamic by which this adaptation is currently occur-
ring. Many commentators seem to conclude from the current lack of fit
between the established type of state formation and global social scale
that the state as such is not adequate to the demands of governing glo-
bal society. This view conflates the two distinct dimensions of political
organisation and social scale. Political organisation does have to be
able to work with social scale, of that we can be certain, but the nature
of their relationship is not one of containment. The state does not con-
tain society, nor is it the role of the state to express society. Rather the
role of the state is to provide the institutional order that brings society
to account in relation to the procedural and substantive norms of jus-
tice. Units of political organisation do not have to match units of social
organisation for there to be a relationship between them.
When we disentangle the two dimensions of political organisation
and social scale, we are ready to contemplate the possibility that, con-
trary to the argument that the relevance of the state has receded in
today’s global society, in fact it has increased. Ours, this global era, is
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an era of the universal extension of state formation to all the peoples of
the world. The universal extension of state formation reflects the es-
tablishment of a post-colonial standard of political legitimacy. It is no
longer acceptable for imperialist structures of political organisation to
be the mode of governing global society. With the development of the
state on a universal scale, the interstate order has had to develop in the
same measure. The problem, then, so far as it exists of a lack of ‘fit’
between political organisation and social scale, does not arise out of
the inability of political organisation to adapt to social scale but out of
an historical conjunction where political organisation in this work of
adaptation is still catching up with contemporary social scale. The proc-
ess of catch-up involves contradictions not least of these being the
persistence of neo-imperialist modes of the political organisation of
social scale alongside newer and still poorly developed post-colonial
ones.
The scale of social interaction always transcends the unit of the
political organisation of social life. The reason for this is that the
horizontal relationships of exchange (of all kinds) cut across the vertical
relationship of the integration of social life into a unit of political
organisation. From the standpoint of any single state, or one unit of
political organisation, the scale of social interaction flows across its
boundaries. There has, however, to be a link between political
organisation and social scale, and this is provided by cooperative
arrangements between states or units of political organisation that
provide for the political management of the patterns of social interaction
that transcend single states. It is for this reason that the contemporary
era of ‘globality’ (Beck 2000; and see also Yeatman 2003) is also that
of the development of interstate institutions of government. These
provide different kinds and degrees of political organisation that match
different aspects of global social scale: trans-state-global
multilateralism; trans-state-regional multilateralism; and trans-state-
bilateralism.
Contrary, then, to those who argue that the grip of the state on social
life is weakening, my argument is that the state has never been so salient
in the political organisation of social life. This point is impossible to
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understand from the position that sees the role of the state as one of
giving expression to society, for here the boundaries of the state should
follow those of society. Should the latter outrun the former, it follows
there must be a weakening of state power and control. This idea of the
role of the state as giving expression to society not only conflates social
scale and the unit of political organisation but it also reduces the
complexity of social scale to a social identity that a single state can
express. The conception of the state as the vehicle of a social identity
is predicated on two assumptions which I reject. The first is that it is
the role of the state as the unit of political organisation to express a
group identity of some kind. The second is that there is no differentiation
of the social and the political, and that it is meaningful to reduce the
state to being the expression of the social. When we disentangle political
organisation from social scale, we are able to appreciate that the state’s
role is a differentiated one — it concerns only the political organisation
of society.
From the standpoint of political organisation, the social is included
only to the extent that it concerns the bases of right or ethical life as
Hegel conceives it. Hegel (1991) offers an elaborated conception of
the rule of law in his idea of ‘right’ in relation to what it means for the
social actor to enjoy the freedom to be a self-determining person. On
this conception it is the role of the state to provide an organised focus
for ethical life understood as relationships that are structured by what
it means to be a self-determining person who is capable of recognising
others as persons too. Whether we adopt the Hegelian perspective, or a
more conventional understanding of the state as the constitutive basis
of the rule of law, it is clear that the normative ideal for the state (and
interstate order) is that of the constitutional state. Thus the social is
included within political organisation only as it is framed by and ori-
ented within the norms, procedures and policies of the constitutional
state. Otherwise it is in the nature of the social to out-run the state, and
there are many aspects of social interaction that have nothing to do
with its being brought to account within the norms, standards and prac-
tices of the constitutional state.
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The mistaken conception of the state’s role as one of the expres-
sion of society (the confusion of political organisation with social scale)
requires those who adopt it to veer between two opinions, both of which
concede the impossibility of political organisation containing social
scale. The first is the conclusion that, in a global society, there can be
no effective political organisation and thus the state must lose its grip
in relation to social life. The second position is a rearguard version of
the first. It takes the form of an argument that somehow the state has to
(re)assert its control over society, that because social scale outstrips
political organisation, there has to be Canute-like effort to brook this
trend and to bring society back into the unit of political organisation as
though it were ever ‘contained’ there.
If the political is thought of as the expression of the social, then we
have to hand a reduction of the political to the social. My argument is
that if such a reduction operates, it is impossible for us to grasp and
understand the significance of the idea of the constitutional state, and
to see that new developments in social scale require this idea to be
revisited and renewed. The cost of making the political a vehicle for
the expression of the social is the loss of the ethical idea of right. There
are many aspects of the social that have no ethical dimension whatso-
ever and still others that are oriented by group-based norms that can-
not be reconciled with ethical life oriented as it is to the freedom of the
person in the company of other persons. The reduction of the political
to the social necessarily leads to neglect of the idea of the constitu-
tional state. When such neglect informs public opinion, it leads to both
a general erosion of this idea and a weakening of constitutionalism in
both theory and practice. Such weakening creates a window of oppor-
tunity for anti-constitutionalist currents of various kinds, these sharing
the view that constitutional constraint should be jettisoned precisely
because it fetters the freedom of the arbitrary will to do as it pleases.
The article is divided into the following sections. In the first, I dis-
cuss further what is at stake in distinguishing social scale and political
organisation. In the second I develop the idea of the constitutional state.
In the third I discuss the development of a contemporary constitution-
alism that is contributing to the renewal of the state’s authority within
a global interstate system. This is a constitutionalism that requires the
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state to be multilateral in its orientation to the interstate system, aware
of the internationalisation of legal reasoning, willing to be held ac-
countable to highly explicit and reflective standards of legal reason-
ing, and oriented to human rights. In the final sections I return to the
point that the idea of the constitutional state is the basis of right, and
argue that we need to recognise anti-constitutionalist currents in our
time for what they are, and to reject them.
The distinction between social scale
and political organisation
Ulrich Beck’s (2000) proposition that social scale today is organised
on a global basis is unexceptionable. He (2000: 10) variously terms
global social scale ‘globality’ or ‘a world society’. In a way that is
congruent with my argument that social scale always outstrips the unit
of political organisation, he points out that it is the nature of global
society to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state.
Beck, however, takes this to mean that world society is not politi-
cally organised. He moves from the proposition that ‘“World society”,
then, denotes the totality of social relationships which are not inte-
grated into or determined (or determinable) by national-state politics’
(Beck 2000: 10, emphasis in the original) to the further proposition:
‘World society without a world state means a society that is not politi-
cally organized, where new opportunities for action and power arise
for transnational actors that have no democratic legitimation’ (Beck
2000: 26, emphasis in the original). He appears to think that because
the nation-state can no longer ‘contain’ society, society on a global
scale will remain politically unorganised.
If the unit of political organisation has to match social scale, then
we face a utopian vision of a world state and a counsel for despair. If
however, political organisation merely has to be adapted to the type of
social scale that prevails, there is no particular reason why the political
form of the state cannot be adapted in this way (for such argument see
Cohen 2001; and also Sassen 2000). This includes the adaptation of




If the particular state cannot contain transnational social space, this
does not mean that transnational social space lies outside the state in
the sense of being beyond the jurisdictional reach of the state. Beck
has overlooked an important feature of global society, and this is the
universal development of the state organisation of society. Now, in a
way that was not the case even 30 years ago, it is the state mode of
organisation that articulates social life for all the world’s peoples. In
the same measure that the state has become the unit of political organi-
sation for all societies, the interstate order has assumed a globally in-
clusive form and global reach. The interstate order has several kinds
and levels of expression: the universal multilateral institutions of law
and governance such as the United Nations; regional multilateral insti-
tutions of policy coordination across states that enable them to cooper-
ate on shared issues and challenges; and bilateral institutions of policy
coordination across states. Statehood does not just pertain to what in-
dividual states do with regard to their internal affairs; it concerns also
their concerted state action. Policy coordination across states currently
assumes an extent and intensity that is largely invisible to actors whose
focus remains largely oriented to the internal affairs of particular states.
This is especially true of the areas of policing, security, immigration
and trade, but it is also true for policy in the areas of higher education,
employment assistance, disability and old age. Where interstate coop-
eration has a regional structure of governance as in the case of Europe
(see Wallace 1999), or the Closer Economic Relations Agreement be-
tween Australia and New Zealand, policy coordination assumes a tight,
regular and routine aspect.
Instead of Beck’s proposition that global society spells the demise
of the state as the unit of effective political organisation, we might
argue then that global society signifies the universal development of
the state as the unit of effective political organisation. As transnational
issues and challenges of security, development and sustainability press
harder, we are likely to see more rather than less coordination of state
action by means of the various expressions and instruments of the in-
terstate system.
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As above, social scale is not the same kind of phenomenon as po-
litical organisation. It is not that they do not have a relationship. They
do. As the unit of political organisation, both singly and in coopera-
tion, states enter into different kinds and degrees of regulation of trans-
state or global social exchange and interaction (see Sassen 2000). For
instance ‘free trade’ is a policy, there are different kinds of free trade
policy (for example, multilateralist and bilateralist regimes), and it is
the nature of policy to be the expression of state agency. State regula-
tory systems are historical in character, and they are changed and
adapted to fit new patterns of social interaction that are structured by
the different kinds of social scale (local, subnational-regional, national,
transnational regionalism, and transnational internationalism).
The primary issue is not whether state-based political organisation
on a coordinated basis across states is available to regulate global social
scale, for it will be and is available. The primary issue concerns how it
operates and whether it is in accord with the values and practices of
contemporary constitutionalism. Interstate cooperation as such is no
guarantor of constitutionalism. When interstate cooperation is structured
by bilateral relationships between a metropole state such as the United
States and client states, this is an arrangement directed by the interest
of the powerful state in maximising its influence, and such an
arrangement will be antagonistic to constitutional values and
procedures.
The development of a constitutionalism that integrates the domes-
tic and interstate orientations of states is one of the challenges for our
time. It is both more developed than we may think — as in, for exam-
ple, the development of a human rights jurisprudence that has impacted
on both domestic jurisdictions and international law — and not as de-
veloped as it needs to be if state formation is to be constitutionally
oriented and, it follows, legitimate.
Thus I accept that the development of existing state formation to
match the challenge of the universal extension of the state as the unit
of political organisation has some way to go. To a considerable degree,
existing state formation is still locked into an imperial-global patterning
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of social scale, one where interstate relations are structured in terms of
a hierarchy of power that determines relationships between states or
by a brittle reaction against these power relationships. Against this back-
ground any genuine multilateralism across states must seem more like
a pious hope than a current reality.1 However, to suggest that existing
state formation requires development in order to be appropriate to glo-
bal social scale is not at all the same thing as suggesting that global
social scale spells the end of the state as the effective unit of political
organisation.
Those who argue the latter proposition are forced into the embrace
of a global civil society that will somehow miraculously do the work
of the state, if this work is to be done at all. These include both the
exponents of the ‘invisible hand’ of global market relationships and
the advocates of a politicised global civil society. They share an inability
to understand the centrality of the state to an ethical ordering of social
life.
Here we discover a further twist arising from the confusion be-
tween social scale and the unit of political organisation. I have said
that social scale always transcends or outstrips the unit of political
organisation. Thus the unit of political organisation cannot control the
relationships and transactions that map social scale. Of course this has
not stopped states from attempting to do this: it is the hallmark of the
totalitarian state to attempt to force social scale to match the effective
reach of its jurisdictional control, but it does not work, not at least if
anyone is to be left standing. That the state cannot control the scale of
social interaction is not the issue, for control is not an appropriate idiom
for thinking about the relationship of the state to society. The basis of
this relationship resides in the legitimacy of state power and this turns
on the capacity of the state to secure an ethical framework for social
action. The conventional account of the raison d’être of the state, and
thus the justification of its power, as Bodin’s 16th-century contempo-
rary, the Chancellor Michel de Hôpital puts it, is ‘de judger et faire
justice’ (McIlwain 1950: 110). From this it follows that the power of
the state, and the nature of the control that is adequate to that power,
are oriented to and limited by right. Since the role of the state is to
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institute society in its aspect as ethical life, control is not the best idea
to suggest the nature of the relationship of the state to society.
If the state is the basis of right, then no amount of stateless
transnational social space will be adequate to the challenge of what is
involved in instituting right. If the idea of right has assumed a global
and universal scope, then it is not the displacement of the state by civil
society that we should have in mind but the further elaboration and
development of the state and the interstate system so as to be adequate
to a universal idea of right. Non-state actors cannot claim the mantle of
right and the public lawful institutional order on which it rests. Society
on a global scale requires that we renew the idea of the constitutional
state so that it is shorn of anachronistic elements belonging to an era
when not all peoples were organised into states, elements for example
that assumed some peoples presented as natural objects for colonisa-
tion by states already in existence.
The idea of the state as a constitutional state
The legitimacy of a particular state resides in its constitutional
orientation as an instantiation of the idea of the state as the basis of
right. The rationality of the state concerns its obligation to secure and
facilitate the integrity of individuals as persons as well as the kind of
society that nourishes and supports individuals as self-determining
persons. We presuppose this rationality when we seek to reform an
empirical state by bringing it back within the framework of
constitutional principles that should inform its policy and practice, or
when we seek to revise established constitutional principles and make
them more relevant to today’s needs. All such action reveals the
centrality of constitutionalism to the raison d’être of the state. It is in
this context that we can understand Bernard Schlink’s (1991: 348)
argument that Hegel’s conception of the state as ‘inherently rational’ is
neither obscure nor utopian:
As a constitutional lawyer, I understand the state as something inherently
rational. This is neither my personal idiosyncrasy nor my German and
European heritage. Research, teaching, and practicing in the field of
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constitutional law all presuppose the apprehension of the inherent rationality
of the state. Without this presupposition we would simply flounder or even
drown in a sea of legal discourse. This is especially evident in the field of
interpretation. Interpretation is the reconstruction of a hidden rational
meaning; interpretation of legal texts lives on the presupposition of their
inherent rationality.
The function of the constitution is to define the parameters and
principles of what it is for the state to act as the institutional basis of
right. Thus constitutional principles assume a foundational status in
relation to all other action on the part of the state (see Alexy 2002), the
import of which is that the judicial, executive and legislative branches
of the state should conduct themselves within the authority, substan-
tive ethic and legality of the constitution.
Constitutional right is foundational in relation to all other law and
policy, and it is the constitutional authority of the entire state acting in
accordance with the rule of law that is the basis of legitimacy. Thus, as
Hegel (1991: 314, §276) argues in relation to the doctrine of the sepa-
ration of powers, the separation of the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches of the state means that they ‘are justified not as inde-
pendent entities, but only in such a way and to such an extent as is
determined by the Idea of the whole; their source is the latter’s author-
ity [Macht] and they are its fluid members, just as it is their simple
self’. The question is not the power of one branch vis-a-vis the others
but whether each fulfils its distinctive role on behalf of the constitu-
tional state as a whole.
Given the championship of plebiscitary democracy and the
consequential elevation of the elected branch of government over the
others, especially the judiciary, it is important to understand the
constitutionalist nature of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
In England it refers to a conception of the rule of law, and originally it
referred to the sovereignty of the King in Parliament, a doctrine that
has a history going back to medieval times (see Suanzes 1999). Suanzes
(1999: §5) says: ‘The doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament is, at
the same time, intimately linked to the medieval idea of the supremacy
of the law — the rule of law — by virtue of which all public powers,
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including the King, must submit to the law.’ It is because this doctrine
was firmly established in England before the centralisation and
strengthening of power in the monarchy occurred under the Tudors
that absolute monarchy was never able to establish its legitimacy in
England.2
Contemporary constitutionalism and the idea
of right in global social context
The idea of constitutionalism has to be periodically rethought so that it
is adequate to current reality. This is occurring at this time even if it
has a long way to go. The question of the basis of the authority of the
state has had to be revisited in relation to three kinds of challenge. The
first of these concerns the challenge to established constitutionalism
posed by the universal idea of right embodied in the international law
of human rights. The second concerns the rethinking of the authority
of the state in relation to principles of internal devolution and of re-
gional interstate communities of governance. The third challenge con-
cerns the internationalisation of law and the impact of this trend on the
rational argumentation of decisions in law within state jurisdictions. In
different ways each of these challenges represents the impact of global
social scale on the idea of the state. Let us briefly address each of these
challenges.
First, there is a general challenge for states, particularly those that
have been stable states oriented to liberal democratic principles of rule,
to rethink the idea of right in relation to the universal conception of
human rights. This is a process that is both ongoing and in its early
stages. The significance of human rights law resides in its development
of a universal idea of the person. Since the status of the person can be
instituted only by means of the constitutional agency of the state, human
rights law directly impacts on the development of the idea of the
constitutional state. Consider in this context the examples of the 1982
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which interprets and adapts
human rights law in Canadian context;3 and the 1998 British Human
Rights Act which gives further legal effect to the European Convention
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on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In both cases the impact
is of a constitutional nature and in the British case there is an
extraordinary rethinking of the rationality of common law
constitutionalism in relation to the European codification of principles
that are explicitly recognised and argued in law (see for example Allan
1996 and Rivers 2002).4 It is inconceivable that before this point of
time British juridical thinkers would be taking German principles of
constitutional law so seriously or that Julian Rivers, in his translation
from the German of Robert Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights,
would so readily apply it to the contemporary British juridical context.
Rivers’s acknowledgment of the substantive as well as the procedural
significance of those rights that have constitutional status is noteworthy
in a context where constitutionalism has had a proceduralist cast. Rivers
(2002: xix) declares certain rights to be constitutional not only because
of ‘their perceived substantive significance as expression of an
underlying morality’, but because also ‘they have a status which is
higher in the hierarchy of legal norms than ordinary legal rights’, and
‘this in turn gives rise to an expectation that they have relevance to the
whole of law’. On this approach there will be a more explicit and
substantively oriented reasoning of legal principles in the common law
jurisdictions that have adopted a codification of human rights. The
idea of the person as the subject of right will be one that is made explicit
in such a way that its universality (the principle of non-discrimination)
can be held to account to reasoned legal argumentation as this is
expressed in an historically specific context. This in turn will develop
the idea of the person and a better understanding of what is substantively
as well as procedurally involved in securing the status of the person
through the agency of the state.
The second challenge, one of rethinking the authority of a particular
state in relation to both its internal and external partners in government
has been provoked by pressures toward internal devolution coupled
with pressures toward integration of a state into some kind of trans-
state regional unit of intergovernmental cooperation. We might term
this trend the development of a multilateral conception of the exercise
of state authority. It reflects the impact of global social scale on units
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of governance so that they become multi-levelled and the state becomes
the authoritative centre for how these different levels of governance
are to be structured as a field of state action. The British case is an
obvious one where the process of integration of the British state into
the institutions of the European Community has intensified over time
and where also within what has been a non-federal state there has been
recent devolution of some domestic state powers to the Scottish
Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and Welsh Assembly. The
Canadian case is also interesting: the patriation of the Canadian
Constitution and the adoption of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms for
all Canadians was the basis of re-negotiating the identity of the Canadian
state in relation both to the fiscally powerful provinces of Canada (see
Chrétien 1990), and its very much more powerful transcontinental
partner in matters of interstate cooperation, the United States. In this
context the survey data reported by Adams (2003) that indicates
Canadians have a different hierarchy of values from Americans, one
that is more friendly to the contemporary non-discriminatory conception
of the person, is suggestive of how the Charter’s conception of right,
one that is in line with the contemporary conception of human rights,
has impacted on the identity of the Canadian polity.
The third challenge concerns the internationalisation of juridical
methods of argumentation and principles. It is evident in the example
I have given of British common law being developed in conversation
with continental legal principles. Lord Slynn of Hadley (1996; and see
also Allan 1996) names two significant aspects of the continentalisation
of British public law, each of which contributes to the development of
an internationally oriented, explicit and reflective substantive legal
rationality. The first one is the principle of proportionality adapted from
German administrative law (‘has the authority gone beyond what is
needed to achieve the desired object’) instead of the doctrine of
Wednesbury reasonableness (‘could a reasonable Minister acting
reasonably in the legislative context have done what the Minister did?’)
as the basis of evaluating the legitimacy of the policy and action of the
state (Lord Slynn 1996: 176). The second is the impact on British
judicial reasoning of the ‘more purposive approach’ of the European
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Court, an approach that asks the question ‘What was Parliament trying
to do?’ in evaluating the validity of a particular piece of legislation
(Lord Slynn 1996: 177). Other examples could be readily given whether
they refer to the internationalisation of the common law tradition itself
(see Lord Cooke of Thorndon 1996) or to the wider impact of
international treaties on state-based law and judicial reasoning (see
Evans 1996). The general impact of the internationalisation of the law
on constitutional thought will be one of requiring constitutional thinkers
and lawyers at the level of the particular state to develop the explicit
rationality of their thought in dialogue with a broader global universe
of constitutional principles and methods of reasoning. To the extent
that this occurs, customary modes of legal argumentation that have
prevailed within a particular state jurisdiction will cede place to a
substantively rational mode of legal reasoning which, in turn, is likely
to contribute to the development of principles of constitutionalism and
to their understanding.
All three trends contribute to the development of an idea of the
constitutional state that is universal in scope and subject to a universally
oriented discourse of rational argumentation. Their effect is to de-
provincialise the self-consciousness of the particular state as a
constitutional state and to bring it into a wider interstate and global
community of thought about the person as the subject of right,
constitutionalism and the institutional agency of the state.
The continuing salience of the state
in global society
In the context of global society the state is certainly not less salient
than it was in a world where state action was primarily focused on a
domestic project of nation-building (see Cohen 2001 on the current
disengagement of ‘the boundaries of the state’s authority from its terri-
torial borders’; also Sassen 2000), and where metropolitan–colonial
axes of integration were more significant than horizontal–multilateral
axes of integration in structuring the relationships between states. If
there is merit in the argument that constitutional principle and reason-
ing assume a more substantively explicit, reasoned and internationally
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applicable aspect than they did before, it is possible to argue that the
state as the basis of right is more salient today than it ever was before.
In support of this argument I would make the following points.
Firstly, the entire reason for being of a constitutional foundation
for a state is to ensure that the state in all its power and authority is
directed by a rational rather than an arbitrary will, whosever will this
may be (that of the government of the day, those who elected this gov-
ernment, or those who have most influence on the government’s deci-
sions). As McIlwain puts it, while government implies will, it must be
bounded by law (1950). The implication of which is that the doctrine
of popular sovereignty does not mean that the people are above the
law. Here Allan’s (1996: 161) citation of Laws J is pertinent:
Ultimate sovereignty rests, in every civilized constitution, not with those
who wield governmental power, but in the conditions under which they
are permitted to do so. The constitution, not the Parliament, is in this sense
sovereign.
Secondly, ‘the people’ is an entity that has authority only to the
extent that it is a public identity that derives from the constitutional
construction of the people as ‘the political society’ whose political
agency is expressed through the state. Contrary to the nationalist im-
aginary (Anderson 1991; and see also Hobsbawm 1990) ‘the people’
does not signify a pre-political social identity. Rather the construction
of ‘the people’ brings into being a public identity that was not there
before, and that continues to exist only as long as it is upheld and
secured by the constitutional state that serves this political society.
Moreover, the historical origins of a particular political society, and
the identity of ‘the people’ that it denotes, has no validity beyond its
continuing to be relevant to and reinterpreted within contemporary con-
stitutional standards of right. As Hegel (1991: §258, 276) puts it: ‘As
far as the Idea of the state itself is concerned, it makes no difference
what is or was the historical origin of the state in general (or rather of
any particular state with its rights and determinations).’ The idea of the




Thus, like any subject, ‘the people’ is historically specific, and any
major constitutional change to how an existing political society is
framed requires the conception of ‘the people’ itself to be remade. Thus,
in the context of the constitutional developments of patriation and the
Charter in Canada, and against Quebec (and to some extent Western
regional) separatism as well as general provincial jockeying for power,
Prime Minister Trudeau followed out the logic of how these
constitutional developments remade the public identity of the Canadian
people. In Chrétien’s (1990: 300–1) words:
The prime minister could not accept what was effectively a vision of Canada
as a country founded by the provinces, with the federal government exist-
ing through their will. Mr Trudeau argued that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts and that the repository of real power in Canada is the
people of the nation as a whole. Therefore he argued that an amending
formula [for the constitution] should contain a referendum provision as a
deadlock-breaking mechanism. The prime minister insisted on enshrining
in the Constitution a recognition of values and ideals shared by Canadians
wherever they live.5
In the Australian context the implication of the High Court Mabo
decision in 1990 that native title was a concept at common law (Bartlett
1993) was and is of major substantive constitutional import for the
construction of ‘the people’ of the Australian state. Paul Keating, when
Prime Minister of Australia gave a major speech (‘the Redfern Park
Speech’) that brings out this import, including these statements:
Mabo is an historic decision. We can make it an historic turning point, the
basis of a new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Aus-
tralians. The message should be that there is nothing to fear or to lose in
the recognition of historical truth, or the extension of social justice, or the
deepening of Australian social democracy to include indigenous Austral-
ians. There is everything to gain (Keating 2000b: 62).
I said we non-indigenous Australians should try to imagine the Aboriginal
view. It can’t be too hard. Someone imagined this event today, and it is
now a marvelous reality and a great reason for hope.
There is one thing we cannot imagine. We cannot imagine that the de-
scendants of people whose genius and resilience maintained a culture here
through 50,000 years or more, through cataclysmic changes to the climate
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and environment, and who then survived two centuries of dispossession
and abuse, will be denied their place in the modern Australian nation. We cannot
imagine that. We cannot imagine that we will fail … (Keating 2000b: 64).
However, Keating (and the Labor Party) lost the federal election of
1996, at which point a government came into power that was led by a
prime minister bent on undoing all the new constitutionally oriented
change in Australia that has been oriented to human rights for all
Australians and to reconciliation with Indigenous Australia. In
consequence, contemporary Australia is profoundly divided between
two distinct and irreconcilable conceptions of ‘the people’ of this state:
an older ‘colonial’ one that sustains the idea of a settler presence that
has an historic tie to the English metropolis; and a new one that is post-
colonial in orientation and informed by human rights law.
Thirdly, human rights are a juridical conception — they exist only
through the agency of the state. Thus, in principle, they are oriented in
terms of the idea of the constitutional state, and make no sense without
this idea. Thus to think as many advocates of a global civil society do
that human rights are independent of the idea of the state expresses a
profound misunderstanding of the nature of right and its dependence
on the state. Contrary to such opinion, human rights are not rights which
the individual possesses against the state. Rather it is the constitutional
state that constitutes the status of the person and secures it. If a particu-
lar government systematically abrogates the state’s constitutional obli-
gations to secure and protect the rights of those who come under its
jurisdiction, then in accordance with the doctrine of the constitutional
state, they are no longer obliged to accept this state’s authority over
them. The logic of this situation implies not that the state is antagonis-
tic to right, but that a particular state has failed in its constitutional
obligations, and that those subject to this state are entitled to seek to
reform it or, if they are suffering under its tyranny, to seek refuge out-
side this particular state.
A constitutional state is one that secures the consent of those sub-
ject to its authority to accept its legitimacy.6 A constitutional state se-
cures consent because its rationality can be matched by the rationality
of those subject to it as they use their freedom to think about right and
its dependence on the constitutional state.
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Fourthly, as Durkheim (1992: 51) put it, the ‘principal function’ of
the state ‘is to think’. Durkheim viewed the state as the organised centre
of a society’s capacity to think about how best to respond to its needs.
The state’s work of thinking about the nature of social issues and how
to address them is expressed in policy analysis. In a global world that
is organised in terms of a highly differentiated and complex type of
social life, thought rather than customary practice must direct the
government of social action. For this reason also the state in its capacity
as a centre of policy guidance and direction, and in policy coordination
with other states, must become more rather than less salient.
Anti-constitutionalist currents
It is in the nature of the constitutional state to constrain the arbitrary
will. Accordingly subjects of whatever type, and for whatever reason,
who resist such constraint will be motivated to resist the authority of
the constitutional state. This is generally how I see the various kinds of
resistance to the contemporary challenge of rethinking the constitutional
state so that it is adequate to global social scale. Such kinds of resistance
include: the unwillingness of particular states to account for their policy
and practice in relation to human rights law (see Zifcak 2003 for the
example of the Australian state under the government of Prime Minister
Howard, 1996 to the present); the unwillingness of private actors who
for reasons of profit or moral righteousness have no respect for
constitutional principle or practice; and the unwillingness of many,
including political parties, to rethink the status of the person in relation
to contemporary standards of inclusion and anti-discrimination.
The particular kind of resistance I want to highlight is the unwill-
ingness to think about right and its dependence on the idea of the state.
This unwillingness to think is displayed in a number of ways (see also
my argument, Yeatman forthcoming). There are those for whom the
complexity of the state within the context of an interstate system in
relation to global social scale defies their desire to have a simple rule-
bound conception of authority. There are also those for whom their
own subjective conception of moral principle has a validity that makes
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it unnecessary for them to become acquainted with the objective world
of contemporary constitutional thought and its institutional expressions.
They enjoy a freedom of being able to focus on what the state is failing
to do in relation to their arbitrary subjective criteria rather than engag-
ing in an informed debate about how best to continue to build the idea
of the state at this time.
Perhaps the most sinister anti-constitutionalist current of our time
is the tendency of existing states to subvert their own constitutionalist
foundations and procedures in the name of security and counter-
terrorism. A Manichean conception of using the force of the state to
eradicate terrorism not only threatens to use state power to destroy
aspects of society but by justifying a state-centred tyranny over society,
it surrenders the legitimacy of state action and converts right into might.
It is all too easy in this context for those who oppose the use of state
power in this way to see the state as inherently antagonistic to right,
and in so doing, they abandon the idea of the constitutional state.
Tragically, such anti-statist opinion colludes with those who for various
reasons act to substitute a unilateralist conception of state will and
force for constitutionalism. If the most powerful state, the United States,
with its counter-terrorist state allies such as Israel, the United Kingdom,
Russia and Australia, elaborates its current practice of proscribing and
hunting down those it casts as hostile to its survival, and uses every
new terrorist action as justification of the use of force rather than law,
then we face a massive onslaught on the idea of the constitutional state.7
A vicious cycle of tyrannous state action that incites the very terrorism
that it seeks to destroy will be substituted for the virtuous cycle of
constitutionalist state action that fosters the kinds of multilateralist
cooperation and dialogue within which the current challenges of global
coexistence can be faced and worked on.
Conclusion
I have argued that contrary to the views of many the state is just as
central as it ever was to the possibility and actuality of right in a global
society. I have argued also that the idea of the state as a constitutional
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state has to be re-thought in the context of global society and that much
work is being done already on this front. There is more work to be
done. If the supremacy of law rather than the supremacy of power is to
frame the conditions of action in the present, then we should lend our
capacity to think to the project of rethinking the constitutional state so
that it is adequate to global social scale.
Notes
1 Paul Keating, Prime Minister of Australia 1991–6, in his account of his
approach to foreign policy as prime minister, exemplifies a post-colonial
multilateralism — for instance this statement: ‘After the [Second World]
war, our neighbours were no longer European colonial powers but
independent and assertive national governments. Now we had to deal with
them directly, and not through London. The Labor Government’s early
support for the Indonesian revolution in 1947 set the stage for a new sort
of Australian engagement with the region: our effective resignation from
the Colonial Club. Labor knew that if our interests were to be protected we
had to develop our own foreign policy, our own institutions, our own
approaches’ (Keating 2000a: 8). Keating in this was building on the
multilateralist conception of the Australian state’s interest that the Labor
Governments under Prime Ministers Whitlam (1971–5) and Hawke (1983–
1991) had championed. Multilateralism enables participating states to be
independent foreign policy actors in a way that bilateral agreements between
stronger and weaker states do not. It is telling that the conservative side of
politics at this time prefers neo-colonial bilateralist arrangements between
states because it sees multilateralist approaches as constraining a state-
based politics that is based in superior power. Here is Keating again on the
first Bush administration’s equivocal relationship to the Australian state
initiative of APEC: ‘George Bush had made a major speech in Detroit on
10 September 1992 in which he had foreshadowed a “strategic network of
free-trade agreements across the Atlantic and the Pacific and in our own
hemisphere.” Back in Canberra, the more we thought about the Detroit
speech the more we worried. It seemed to foreshadow a retreat from the
[Asian-Pacific] region-wide approach that APEC offered to a more limited
strategy in which the United States would deal with countries individually.
Senior Administration officials were speaking to our embassy of the need
to “encircle” Japan with a network of free-trade agreements. Such an
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approach was hardly in Australia’s interest. Japan was our largest trading
partner, and our two-way trade with Japan was worth nearly $20 billion.
Unlike the United States, we ran a substantial trade surplus with Japan
(and a substantial deficit with the United States). We did not benefit from
approaches that discriminated against Japan’. And: ‘We were to learn later
that suspicion of such multilateral approaches was one of the main foreign
policy differences between the Bush and Clinton administrations’ (Keating
2000a: 33).
2 Suanzes (1999: §32–3) cites Pocock’s work on the idea of the ancient or
‘old’ constitution in England, an idea that has the acts of the sovereign
derive from a pre-existing body of customary law. He (§33) says: ‘In any
case, it must be added that throughout the 17th century, common law judges
were forced to accept — not without complaints — the supremacy of the
Statutes approved by Parliament in exchange for Parliament’s recognition
of the importance of customary law within the system — only subject to
the laws of Parliament — and the essential role of Judges in the Rule of
Law. In reality the alliance between Parliament (particularly the Commons)
and the common law judges was fundamental to the triumph of Constitu-
tionalism over Absolutism. An alliance that facilitated the acknowledge-
ment that additionally Parliament was the highest judicial authority in the
kingdom.’
3 Thus a legal text on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms declares
(Beaudoin & Mendes 1996: 1–2): ‘With the advent of the Charter, the
principles on which the rights and freedoms of Canadians are based have
the status of constitutional law. … The judiciary’s responsibility and power
to uphold these rights and freedoms now exists as an integral part of the
process of Canadian government. The fundamental principle underlying
this dimension of our most basic law is that there are some phases of Cana-
dian life which should normally be beyond the reach of any majority, save
by constitutional amendment.’
4 One wonders if the following comment by Allan (1996: 147) could have
been made without this context for the rethinking of the rationality of the
common law — his reference to Australia is because he, a scholar in con-
stitutional law at Cambridge, is contributing to a discussion of the Mason
Court in Australia, one of the high points of Australian right-oriented adju-
dication: ‘I want to argue that constitutional law, if it is rational, is ulti-
mately an exercise in political theory; and the imaginative decisions of the
modern [Australian] High Court illuminate the nature of some of the fun-
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damental questions of authority, legitimacy, and freedom which all the
constitutional democracies are required to confront — questions to which
they are likely to seek analogous, if not identical, answers.’
5 The provinces had acquired considerable fiscal power in the context of
Canadian federalism since 1959 (for details see Chrétien 1990: 292–3),
the effect of which ‘was that as the federal government levied a smaller
proportion of the taxes, the rich provinces got richer and the poor got poorer’
(Chrétien 1990: 293). In this context the Trudeau conception of a new
Charter-based federalism that ensured mobility of rights, constitutional
protection against discrimination ‘based on province of residence of per-
sons and province of origin or destination of goods, services and capital’,
and ‘explicit federal jurisdiction to regulate trade and commerce’ (Chrétien
1990: 294–5) makes sense.
6 In this connection, consider the following interpretation of Social Contract
doctrine by Keith Mason (1996: 45) in relation to the idea of popular sov-
ereignty in Australian High Court jurisprudence of the 1980s: ‘The contri-
bution made by the social compact theory of authority and legitimacy of
government being derived from the Australian people is explained by the
following propositions:
Major premise — all public authority is derived from the people
Minor premise — the people would not have been silly enough to arm
government with power to do X
Result — the Executive cannot do X, nor (if the limitation can find a toe-
hold in the Constitution) can Parliament authorize it.’
7 Naomi Klein (2004: A21) refers to this as ‘the Likudization of the world’.
She explains: ‘Common wisdom has it that, after Sept. 11, a new era of
geopolitics was ushered in, defined by what is usually called the “Bush
doctrine”: pre-emptive wars, attacks on “terrorist infrastructure” (read en-
tire countries), and an insistence that all the enemy understands is force. It
would be more accurate to call this rigid world view the “Likud doctrine”.
What happened on Sept. 11 is that the Likud doctrine, previously used
only [by the contemporary Israeli state] against the Palestinians, was picked
up by the most powerful nation on Earth and applied on a global scale.
Call it the Likudization of the world, the real legacy of Sept. 11 … It’s not
simply that Mr. Bush sees America’s role as protecting Israel from a hos-
tile Arab world. It’s that he has cast the U.S. in the same role in which
Israel casts itself, facing the same threat. In this narrative, the U.S. is fight-
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ing a never-ending battle for its survival against irrational forces that seek
nothing less than its total extermination.’
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